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ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT*  
First Amendment law has reached a crossroads. Over the past several 
years, the Supreme Court has made three analytic moves that, in 
combination, are putting unsustainable pressure on its current 
doctrinal structure. First, the Court appears to be defining the word 
“speech” expansively, to include all forms of communication and 
information sharing. Second, the Court has severely limited the scope 
of “low-value” speech, suggesting that except for a few historically 
defined categories of speech, all oral and written communication 
deserves full constitutional protection. Third, the Court has held that 
any law or regulation that regulates protected speech based on its 
content must be subject to extremely stringent “strict” scrutiny, and is 
presumptively unconstitutional. The result is that under current law, it 
is exceedingly difficult to regulate speech based on harms associated 
with its content except in a few, narrow, and usually irrelevant 
circumstances. 
 
This catholic approach to free speech protections, however, is 
unsustainable. The reason, quite simply, is that in the world of the 
Internet and modern computing, information and communication are 
instantaneously and universally shared, impossible to suppress or 
control, and at times highly dangerous or destructive. As a result, the 
harm associated with some forms of speech has been vastly magnified, 
at the same time that the Court has severely constrained the ability to 
regulate speech to prevent such harms. In addition, the primary 
commodity traded and stored in the new information economy, data, is 
technically “speech” on the Court’s current view, and so essentially 
immune from regulation. This tension is unsustainable. 
 
The solution, I would posit, is that we must reconsider what exactly 
constitutes “speech” for First Amendment purposes—in Fred 
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Schauer’s words, we must reconsider the “coverage” of the First 
Amendment. Moreover, rather than excluding specific types of speech 
from coverage in an ad hoc fashion, as courts have done to date, we 
must develop a theoretical structure to guide those decisions. 
Otherwise, the entire free speech project risks descending into judicial 
favoritism. This Article begins the task of identifying a methodology for 
defining First Amendment coverage. 
 
I begin by demonstrating that the word “speech” in the First 
Amendment does not, and cannot, literally refer to all uses of language. 
In particular, I note that language, both oral and written, can 
sometimes be used in noncommunicative ways, and that such uses of 
language may not be constitutional “speech,” even if they are literally 
speech. I then discuss other situations where even acts of 
communication are and must be subject to extensive regulation based 
on their content for a variety of reasons. All language, then, is not 
“speech,” nor even is all communication. 
 
Ultimately, some gauge is necessary by which to judge when speech is, 
or is not, “speech.” Moreover, the only possible source of guidance in 
developing such a standard is free speech theory. Until now, the 
Supreme Court has refused to adopt an overarching theory of free 
speech, and scholars remain divided on the issue. Moving forward, 
however, this studious ambiguity is unsustainable. What is needed is a 
new paradigm, firmly rooted in the history, text, and purposes of the 
First Amendment. 
 
I ultimately conclude that the advancement of democratic self-
government is the only plausible candidate for such an overarching 
theory. Such a reading of the First Amendment is supported by text, 
drafting history, and historical context, and enjoys widespread support 
among scholars and judges. Once this understanding is accepted, 
however, it has profound implications for the question of First 
Amendment coverage. Even if one adopts a sophisticated and capacious 
view of what sorts of communicative activities are relevant to self-
governance—an approach that I fully endorse—clearly not all uses of 
language qualify. The First Amendment poses no barriers to regulating 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prayer. Private diaries. Speaking to oneself (or intrapersonal 
communication, in the argot). Blocking or slowing access to specific websites. 
These seemingly disparate human activities all have one thing in common: they 
involve the expression or selection of language, whether oral, written, or 
electronic, and so seemingly constitute speech. However, none of these 
activities are inherently communicative in the sense of intentionally sending a 
message to an audience. Are they then protected by the First Amendment? 
Now consider sale or disclosure of personal information or images 
(including Big Data). Faulty navigation charts. Conversion Therapy. 
Incompetent legal or medical advice. All of these are clearly communicative 
uses of language and so literally speech. Nor do any of them fall within a 
previously recognized category of “low-value” speech.1 Yet most people would 
agree that these forms of speech must be susceptible to some forms of regulation 





                                                                                                                     
 1 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (naming the recognized 
categories of unprotected speech). 
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Modern First Amendment doctrine can answer neither of these questions in 
a satisfactory manner. The first it has barely considered, and the second it 
impliedly answers in a manner that defies common sense. That is a fundamental 
failure of logic and imagination. Almost a century after Justice Holmes began 
constructing the edifice of modern free speech law,2 it is astonishing that such 
basic issues remain so opaque. 
The truth is that for the past century, courts muddled through difficult free 
speech issues because they had no theoretical basis for resolving such 
foundational questions, and because they could do so without creating 
unacceptable social harms. In this Article, I will argue that doctrinal and 
technological developments over the past several years have made this approach 
unsustainable. At this point, staying the course (or more accurately, having no 
course) threatens to produce results that are so completely unacceptable that 
something has to give. I suppose courts might continue to avoid the hard 
questions by rejecting thoroughly plausible First Amendment claims without 
any reasoning—as they have regularly done in the terrorism context3—but that 
is a dissatisfying and risky strategy. Instead, it is time to confront the question 
of what the phrase “freedom of speech” in the First Amendment actually means. 
To use Fred Schauer’s language, we need a theory describing “the coverage of 
the First Amendment.”4 
My primary goal in this Article is to demonstrate that free speech doctrine 
is on a collision course with reality. I begin in Part II by describing what I call 
the “coverage crisis” in First Amendment law, laying out the doctrinal 
developments that have expanded the scope of the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause beyond reason. I further argue that while the current Court’s 
relentless drive to create simple rules that maximize the First Amendment’s 
coverage and stringency would probably always have been a bad idea, in today’s 
world it is unsustainable. The reason, quite simply, is the spread of the Internet 
and modern information technology. These developments have two 
consequences. First, today information and speech spread instantaneously, 
ubiquitously, and without hope of retrieval. As such, the harm potentially caused 
by speech has increased exponentially from the era of the print, or even 
broadcast media, even as First Amendment doctrine makes regulation to 
mitigate harms ever more difficult. Second, in the information economy, data is 
perhaps the most valuable commodity traded in markets; but because (as we 
shall see) under the Court’s approach data is speech, the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
 2 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (announcing “clear and present 
danger” test for suppressing incitement); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that clear and present danger test should be applied in a 
speech-protective manner). 
 3 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Terrorism and Associations, 63 EMORY L.J. 581, 585–604 
(2014) (collecting such cases). 
 4 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004). 
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would appear to shield data from most regulation. The result is a new form of 
Lochnerism.5 
The above analysis strongly suggests that the Court’s working assumption 
that all speech presumptively enjoys full constitutional protection cannot be 
correct. In Parts III and IV, I explore various uses of language—both 
communicative and noncommunicative—which appear, under the Court’s 
current jurisprudence, to be fully protected speech, but which nevertheless must 
for practical purposes be subject to substantial regulation. This discussion 
therefore provides empirical support for the theoretical conclusion of Part II: 
that not all speech is constitutional “speech.” 
Part V turns to the positive task of developing an approach to First 
Amendment coverage which makes transparent judgments about the meaning 
and value of speech, and allocates protection based on those judgments. Such 
an approach must be rooted in an overarching theory of free speech, something 
that the Court has to date refused to adopt. I conclude that there is only one 
possible such theory. The text, the drafting history, and the historical context of 
the First Amendment all support the proposition that the primary purpose of the 
Amendment is to enable and advance democratic self-governance. This 
conclusion, however, has important implications for First Amendment 
coverage, because while a wide range of communicative activities are related to 
self-governance, some clearly are not. Finally, Parts VI and VII close by 
applying a self-governance approach to First Amendment coverage to the 
examples described in Parts III and IV. 
II. THE COVERAGE CRISIS IN FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 
As Fred Schauer famously pointed out twelve years ago, there are many, 
many uses of language, the regulation of which is generally understood to raise 
no First Amendment issues.6 Examples include securities regulation, antitrust 
laws applied to information sharing, criminal solicitation, products liability 
based on poor instructions, and many others.7 Yet most of these examples do 
not fall within any currently accepted “exception” to the First Amendment, thus 
making nonsense of the common assertion that all speech is protected unless it 
falls within a recognized exception to the First Amendment.8 Thus was born the 
concept of First Amendment “coverage,” which has since received significant 
                                                                                                                     
 5 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 64 (1905) (striking down labor regulation 
as violating the Due Process Clause); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 
133, 182–91 (2016) (arguing that modern First Amendment doctrine threatens to recreate the 
laissez faire constitutional regime of Lochner). 
 6 Schauer, supra note 4, at 1770–71. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 1768; see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–70 (2010). 
 
844 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:4 
scholarly attention (though essentially none from the courts).9 Schauer also 
pointed out, convincingly, that the scope of the First Amendment’s coverage 
cannot possibly be determined based on “the ordinary language meaning of the 
word ‘speech.’”10 Finally, Schauer argued that no existing theory of the First 
Amendment can explain the scope of its coverage,11 and therefore coverage can 
only be explained as a product of nondoctrinal “political, economic, social, and 
cultural” factors.12 
I completely agree with Schauer every step of the way, except that last. I do 
not think that an amorphous set of factors can be the basis of a theory of 
coverage that can actually be operationalized (though I concede that Schauer 
may well be correct as a descriptive matter with regard to current practices). 
Schauer himself observed that in our society, the First Amendment exhibits a 
“magnetism” by which invocation of the First Amendment lends huge rhetorical 
advantages.13 Increasingly, it leads to litigants raising plausible, and often 
successful First Amendment claims in unlikely situations.14 Net neutrality is 
surely an example; it is hard to believe that during the twentieth century almost 
anyone would have believed that imposing common carrier obligations on a 
telecommunications carrier would even implicate the First Amendment.15 
Similarly, a rule requiring companies to (truthfully) disclose in their Securities 
and Exchange Commission filings whether they used conflict minerals 
originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo would surely not have been 
thought to raise First Amendment problems even forty years ago—when First 
Amendment protections were extended to commercial speech16—yet recently 
the D.C. Circuit found such a rule unconstitutional.17 As another example, 
regulation of professional speech has been a ubiquitous part of social practices 
for centuries without being thought to raise any First Amendment concerns. 
Recently, however, extensive litigation has been brought challenging 
professional speech regulations,18 and the subject has generated substantial 
                                                                                                                     
 9 Schauer, supra note 4, at 1769. 
 10 Id. at 1773. 
 11 Id. at 1784–87. 
 12 Id. at 1765, 1800–07. 
 13 Id. at 1787–90. 
 14 See infra Part III. 
 15 See infra Part III.C. 
 16 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 
(1976). 
 17 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(reaffirming decision to strike down statute and rule requiring disclosure of conflict minerals 
as violating the First Amendment). 
 18 See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (invalidating statute prohibiting physicians from asking about, and keeping records 
regarding, gun ownership by their patients or their patients’ families); King v. Governor of 
N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 241–43 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding ban on licensed therapists conducting 
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scholarship.19 Finally, Andy Koppelman has pointed out that under current 
doctrine, laws regulating so-called “revenge porn”—a grotesque social practice 
whereby former boyfriends post sexually explicit pictures of their exes without 
permission20—very probably violate the First Amendment,21 even though such 
laws would surely have been thought unproblematic until quite recently. 
The crisis of coverage that I describe above is very real. Here, I wish to 
briefly trace the three recent doctrinal developments that, in combination with 
modern technology, have if not created, then certainly accentuated, this crisis. 
The first doctrinal development is an increasingly unyielding insistence by 
the Court that all technology, all communication, and all forms of information 
sharing constitute fully protected “speech” for First Amendment purposes. Over 
the past quarter century, the Court has adhered to this principle seemingly 
without exception. In 1994, it held that cable television operators’ decisions 
regarding which channels to transmit on their systems are protected by the First 
Amendment.22 In 1997, it extended the highest level of First Amendment 
protection to Internet communications.23 In 2000, the Court held that cable 
television channels primarily dedicated to sexually explicit programming carry 
fully protected speech.24 In 2002, it extended full protection to “virtual child 
pornography”—depictions that appear to be of minors engaged in sexual 
conduct, but not involving actual minors.25 In 2004, it was the turn of 
commercial websites displaying sexually explicit content accessible to 
minors.26 And in 2011, the Court held that video games, including violent video 
games sold to minors, received exactly the same level of protection as other 
communicative media, finding the interactive nature of video games 
irrelevant.27 In an even more eye-opening decision in 2012, a plurality of the 
Court would have treated intentional lies as fully within the scope of the First 
                                                                                                                     
“conversion therapy” to try and “convert” homosexual teenagers); Pickup v. Brown, 740 
F.3d 1208, 1222–23, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). 
 19 See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016); 
Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 4 n.10), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827762 [https://perma.cc/3Z49-L22S] 
(summarizing extant scholarship). 
 20 Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 
EMORY L.J. 661, 661 (2016). 
 21 Id. at 662. 
 22 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1994); see infra 
Part III.C. 
 23 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868–70 (1997). 
 24 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–12 (2000). 
 25 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 248–50, 256 (2002). 
 26 Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666–67 (2004). 
 27 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011); see also infra notes 45–
49 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment,28 and a majority agreed that knowing falsehoods received 
substantial protection,29 all despite earlier, well-considered dictum stating 
without caveat that false statements of fact have “no constitutional value.”30 
Finally, and most stunningly, the Court strongly suggested in 2011 (though it 
has not yet held) that all sales of data, including mass personal data, constitute 
speech fully within the coverage of the First Amendment.31 The Court’s current, 
gung ho approach can be contrasted with previous eras, in which the Court at 
first granted no protection to motion pictures,32 and granted quite limited 
protection to broadcast television and radio.33 This is not to say that the modern 
approach is entirely wrong—some of these decisions (notably regarding Internet 
traffic and virtual child pornography) are surely correct. But there has 
undoubtedly been a change of attitude on the Court. 
The second doctrinal development involves First Amendment “exceptions.” 
As demonstrated by the cases just discussed, the current doctrinal structure of 
free speech law assumes that all speech—meaning communication—is 
protected by the First Amendment unless it falls within a First Amendment 
“exception.” The implications of this broad-brush approach were, until recently, 
mitigated, however, by the widely shared belief, rooted in language from the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire34 and New York v. 
Ferber,35 that courts could create and announce new, unprotected categories of 
speech if they concluded that the speech was of minimal value, and whatever 
value it had was vastly outweighed by the social interest in suppressing it. These 
unprotected categories essentially provided a safety valve for free speech theory, 
permitting the courts to reconcile the general presumption in favor of free 
speech with the social need, in specific instances, for regulation. In United States 
v. Stevens in 2010, however, the Court renounced this form of analysis.36 The 
issue in Stevens was the constitutionality of a statute that barred the sale or 
possession of depictions of animal cruelty.37 Though the primary target of the 
statute was “crush videos” depicting women slowly crushing small animals to 
death (this is apparently a sexual fetish), Stevens was convicted for selling 
                                                                                                                     
 28 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–45 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 29 Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 30 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
 31 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011); see infra Part IV.A. 
 32 Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243–44 (1915), overruled 
by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502–03 (1952). 
 33 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386–90 (1969). 
 34 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942) (holding “fighting 
words” to be unprotected speech after applying a balancing analysis). 
 35 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (holding child pornography to be an 
unprotected category of speech under a similar balancing analysis). 
 36 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
 37 Id. at 464–65. 
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videos of dog fighting.38 The Government argued that because depictions of 
animal cruelty had minimal First Amendment value, and because the 
Government’s regulatory interest was strong, the Court should follow the 
approach it took in Ferber with respect to child pornography and declare such 
depictions categorically outside the First Amendment.39 The Court refused.40 
Indeed, it described such “categorical balancing” as “startling and dangerous.”41 
It held instead that unprotected categories cannot be “created,” they must be 
rooted in long-standing historical practice.42 And while there was a long history 
of barring animal cruelty, there was no such history with respect to depictions 
of animal cruelty.43 As a result, the Court invalidated the statute.44 
A year later, the Court reaffirmed this position in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n.45 Brown involved a challenge to a California statute that 
barred the sale or rental to minors of violent video games.46 Again, the 
Government sought a ruling categorically excluding some speech—here, 
violent speech directed at children—entirely from the First Amendment.47 And 
again, the Court refused because of the lack of any historical basis for such an 
exclusion.48 In particular, the Court pointed out that literature historically 
deemed suitable for children, including Grimm’s Fairy Tales, are full of 
extraordinary violence.49 The consequence of the Stevens and Brown decisions 
is to substantially restrict the ability of courts to make judgments regarding the 
value of speech, in the course of deciding whether to extend protection to it. 
These cases also strongly endorse the modern view that all speech is fully 
protected, unless it falls within a narrow, historically based exemption.50 
Finally, by focusing on history, the Court provided no tools that can be used to 
assess whether and how to protect new forms of speech, such as Big Data, 
revenge porn, or broadband Internet access. 
The third doctrinal development is exemplified by the Court’s 2015 decision 
in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.51 Reed involved a challenge to an ordinance adopted 
by the Town of Gilbert regulating the placement of outdoor signs within the 
                                                                                                                     
 38 Id. at 465–66. 
 39 Id. at 469–70. 
 40 Id. at 470. 
 41 Id. at 470. 
 42 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471–72. 
 43 Id. at 472. 
 44 Id. at 482. 
 45 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791–92 (2011). 
 46 Id. at 789. 
 47 Id. at 794. 
 48 Id. at 794–95. 
 49 Id. at 795–96. 
 50 Id. at 790–92; United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–70 (2010). 
 51 See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
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town’s boundaries.52 Reed, the pastor of an itinerant religious congregation, 
objected to the fact that the ordinance placed much more onerous restrictions on 
signs he wished to erect—directional signs to his religious services—than on 
“political” and “ideological” signs.53 The Court ruled for Reed and struck down 
the ordinance, holding that any law that on its face regulated speech based on 
the content of that speech was subject to strict scrutiny, even if the law had no 
censorial motives.54 In so holding, the Court rejected a contrary position adopted 
by some lower courts55 (and based on language in some of the Supreme Court’s 
own opinions)56 suggesting that illicit motive was the sine qua non for invoking 
strict scrutiny.57 Application of strict scrutiny means that the challenged law 
will be upheld only if the government can prove that the restriction furthers a 
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored, meaning that it is the 
least restrictive means, to achieve that interest.58 In the modern era, at least with 
respect to free speech cases, this analysis has almost invariably led to 
invalidation of challenged statutes.59 Like the other doctrinal developments 
discussed here, the consequence of this decision is to restrict judicial flexibility 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Id. at 2224. 
 53 Id. at 2224–26. 
 54 Id. at 2227–28. 
 55 E.g., Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that a 
city ordinance that regulated the subject matter without reference to the actual content of 
speech was content neutral), rev’d, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing in response 
to the Supreme Court’s contrary holding in Reed), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016); 
Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated by Cent. Radio 
Co. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625, 632 (4th Cir. 2016) (abrogating the earlier case only 
“due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed”); Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 
638 (1998) (“A speech restriction is content-neutral if it is ‘justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
 56 Compare Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–20 (2000) (“[G]overnment regulation 
is ‘content neutral’ if it is justified without reference to the content of regulated speech.”), 
and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The principal inquiry in 
determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally . . . , is whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The 
government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.”), with Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 
(“We . . . have no need to consider the government’s justifications or purposes for enacting 
the [law] to determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.”). 
 57 Id. at 2228. 
 58 Id. at 2231. 
 59 The only modern counterexamples are Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 
U.S. 1, 39 (2010), which involved national security, and perhaps Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 
135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015), which involved the fraught issue of judicial elections, and in 
which the Court heavily splintered. 
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in the face of seemingly socially beneficial regulation of speech, and therefore 
to reduce legislative authority as well.60 
Finally, we come to the technological changes that have accentuated the 
consequences of the above-described doctrinal developments. They are, of 
course, the spread of the Internet and the related growth of the information 
economy. In a world in which anyone can communicate instantaneously to an 
almost unlimited audience, and in which bits and data are some of the most 
important commodities sold in the economy, free speech issues necessarily arise 
constantly, and the stakes in these disputes are hugely magnified. The reasons 
are three-fold. 
First, the ubiquity and permanency of information on the Internet sharply 
increases the harms that speech can impose, as exemplified by revenge porn and 
other invasions of privacy or releases of personal data.61 Conflicts between free 
speech and privacy are not, of course, wholly new. However, the advent of the 
Internet has entirely changed the magnitude of the harm caused by such 
communications. By making private facts or images universally and easily 
accessible, the victims of such invasions of privacy cannot escape them. One 
cannot move to another city to get a fresh start, because one cannot escape the 
Internet. Future employers and acquaintances will always be able to access the 
private information with a simple Google search. Changing one’s name is not a 
serious option for many people because their job histories, credentials, etc., are 
tied to their existing names, which must therefore be disclosed at least to 
putative employers. And once material is on the Internet, it is notoriously 
difficult to scrub it even if such a legal remedy is available, as illustrated by a 
tragic recent revenge porn episode in Italy.62 None of this was true in the pre-
Internet era of print and broadcast media. 
Second, in the information economy, economic regulation increasingly 
involves regulation of data.63 However, the Court has strongly suggested that 
                                                                                                                     
 60 Assuming, that is, that the lower courts follow Reed. For recent indications that that 
may not happen, see Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 846 
F.3d 391, 403–06 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding a sign ordinance to be content neutral when it 
was obviously content based under Reed), and Judge Tjoflat’s dissenting opinion in the 
Wollschlaeger litigation. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1330–38 
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 223, 227 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra Part IV. 
 62 James Masters & Livia Borghese, Tiziana Cantone’s Family Calls for Justice After 
Suicide over Sex Tape, CNN (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/europe/ 
tiziana-cantone-sex-tape-suicide/ [https://perma.cc/BSA6-QE58].  
 63 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 588–61 (describing state law 
regulating the sale of prescriber-identifying data to data-miners in the pharmaceutical 
industry). 
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data is fully protected speech, albeit in dictum,64 but dictum entirely consistent 
with the Court’s modern doctrine. Data regulation, moreover, almost inevitably 
targets specific forms of data, making the regulations content based.65 This 
means that every such regulation arguably triggers strict scrutiny under Stevens 
and Reed, making it presumptively unconstitutional. 
Finally, another consequence of the information economy is the importance 
of unfettered access to the Internet, for both businesses and individuals. 
Regulation of Internet access, however, can easily—as we shall see66—involve 
government control over data flows, meaning that such regulation also 
implicates the First Amendment. As with the example of data regulation, this 
result seems highly counterintuitive, yet both follow clearly from the collision 
of modern doctrine and technology. 
The ultimate thesis of this Article is that the problems described above can 
only be resolved by adopting an overarching theory of First Amendment 
coverage. I begin, however, by questioning the position that is the current 
Court’s orthodoxy: that the First Amendment presumptively protects all speech, 
unless it falls within a narrowly defined and historically recognized category of 
unprotected speech such as obscenity.67 I start by identifying several examples 
of noncommunicative uses of language that, even though they may be speech 
within the dictionary definition, seem far afield from the First Amendment. I 
then identify some examples of communicative uses of language that 
nonetheless should, I will argue (perhaps more controversially), be subject to 
regulation without serious constitutional constraints. Together, these examples 
seriously undermine the Court’s underlying assumptions regarding coverage. 
III. NONCOMMUNICATIVE SPEECH 
The leading Supreme Court decision addressing the “coverage” of the First 
Amendment is Spence v. Washington.68 In that case, the Court held that 
Spence’s actions in hanging an upside down flag outside his apartment with a 
peace symbol made of black tape attached to both sides constituted 
communicative conduct protected by the First Amendment.69 The Court 
provided this explanation: “An intent to convey a particularized message was 
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the 
                                                                                                                     
 64 Id. at 570 (“There is thus a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information 
[(a form of electronic data)] is speech for First Amendment purposes.”); see also infra Part 
IV. 
 65 See infra Part IV. 
 66 See infra Part III.C. 
 67 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 68 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (per curiam). 
 69 Id. at 406, 410. 
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message would be understood by those who viewed it.”70 Later cases have 
continued to quote this passage as the definitive test to determine whether 
particular conduct falls within the First Amendment’s protection,71 and 
Spence’s requirements of a speaker intending to communicate a message, along 
with a likely audience, seem an intuitively reasonable definition of what 
constitutes expression. 
What is notable, however, is that all the cases exploring the limits of 
First Amendment coverage involve expressive conduct.72 The contrary 
assumption has been that any use of language, either oral or written, 
necessarily constitutes “speech” for First Amendment purposes, and I am not 
aware of a single Supreme Court case questioning or even examining this 
proposition. Do all uses of language constitute “speech” for constitutional 
purposes? Here, we consider the problem of uses of language that lack an 
audience and/or communicative intent. 
I begin with one example of nonspeech uses of language that is important, 
but ultimately does not, I think, advance our understanding of the First 
Amendment. As J.L. Austin famously noted, sometimes language does not only 
(or at all) communicate ideas or facts, it rather changes social reality, often by 
creating legal effects.73 Examples include saying “I do,” or “You’re Fired.” 
Similarly, in an important decision the Second Circuit noted that computer 
software has both expressive and functional elements—it not only 
communicates information, it also acts on the world.74 Based on that distinction, 
the Second Circuit upheld regulation targeting only the functional element of 
software.75 For the same reason, no one doubts that the government may 
regulate the “performative” effects of speech, such as through employment 
discrimination legislation or prohibiting the marriage of close relatives. 
Ultimately, however, these results seem unrelated to the First Amendment 
because the target of regulation in these instances is not speech as such, but 
rather distinct functional or legal changes to the world. 
Aside from “performative” or “functional” speech, however, the underlying 
assumption of the Supreme Court’s modern free speech jurisprudence is clearly 
that all language is speech, though the Court has never clearly articulated, much 
                                                                                                                     
 70 Id. at 410–11. 
 71 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 305 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 72 E.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404–06 (holding that flag burning is expressive conduct); 
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11 (attaching peace symbol made of tape to flag is expressive 
conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (wearing black 
armbands in protest of war as expressive conduct). 
 73 J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 148–52 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà 
eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1962); see also JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 16–19 (1969). 
 74 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 75 Id. at 453–58. 
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less examined, that assumption. The issue did, however, arise in a long-running 
litigation in the Second Circuit in which a religious congregation sought access 
to public property.76 The result was instructive. 
A. Is Prayer Speech? 
In 1994, Bronx Household of Faith, a religious congregation, applied to use 
space in a public middle school in the Bronx to hold its Sunday church 
services.77 Its application was denied, triggering a Dickensian twenty years of 
litigation that included at least five separate trips to the Second Circuit.78 In what 
is for our purposes the most important chapter, Bronx Household IV, the Second 
Circuit considered the constitutionality of a Standard Operating Procedure 
(SOP) adopted by the New York City Board of Education which flatly barred 
the use of school property for “religious worship services, or otherwise using a 
school as a house of worship.”79 An earlier version of the board’s SOP had 
excluded “religious services or religious instruction,” but had to be amended in 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School,80 which had struck down an essentially identical policy as a viewpoint-
based restriction on speech in a limited public forum.81 The question in Bronx 
Household IV was whether this amendment saved the SOP from invalidation.82 
By a two-to-one vote, the Second Circuit held that it did.83 Judge Leval, 
writing for himself and Judge Calabresi, found that a ban on religious worship 
services did not restrict speech, but rather “bars a type of activity.”84 According 
to the majority, “[p]rayer, religious instruction, expression of devotion to God, 
and the singing of hymns, whether done by a person or a group, do not constitute 
the conduct of religious worship services” and so were not excluded by the 
SOP.85 Indeed, the board did not even “prohibit use of the facility by a person 
or group of persons for ‘worship.’ What is prohibited by this clause is solely the 
conduct of a particular type of event: a collective activity characteristically done 
                                                                                                                     
 76 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household IV), 650 F.3d 30, 36 
(2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1087 (2015). 
 77 Id. at 33. 
 78 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household V), 750 F.3d 184, 188 
(2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1730 (2015). See generally CHARLES DICKENS, 
BLEAK HOUSE (Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin Books 1996) (using multigenerational 
litigation as a plot device). 
 79 Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 34–35, 35 n.4. 
 80 Id. at 33–34. 
 81 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 82 Id. at 35–36.  
 83 Id. at 32. 
 84 Id. at 36. 
 85 Id. 
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according to an order prescribed by and under the auspices of an organized 
religion, typically but not necessarily conduct by an ordained official of the 
religion.”86 
Judge Walker issued a sharp dissent.87 In short, his argument was that the 
majority’s distinction between protected religious speech and worship on the 
one hand, and unprotected religious worship services on the other, was 
indefensible because “the conduct of ‘services’ is the protected expressive 
activity of the sort recognized in Good News Club.”88 He also pointed out that 
in an earlier Supreme Court opinion dealing with access to public spaces by 
religious groups, the Court seemed to reject any distinction between religious 
speech and “worship.”89 Therefore, under the dissent’s view, exclusion of 
religious worship services constituted exclusion of religious speech, which in 
turn the Good News Club Court had held was unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination.90 
At first glance, Judge Walker seems to have by far the better of this 
exchange. The majority’s attempt to analogize exclusion of religious worship 
services to the exclusion of “martial arts matches, livestock shows, and 
horseback riding”91 is utterly unconvincing because unlike those other 
activities, religious worship is conducted almost entirely through words and 
clearly communicative gestures such as placing one’s hands together in prayer 
or kneeling. Indeed, the entire distinction the majority draws between “worship” 
and “worship services” is, to put it mildly, obscure. Finally, while this is hardly 
the only area in which a court has resolved a difficult First Amendment problem 
by simply relabeling expression as “conduct,”92 this amounts to little more than 
evasion. 
Nonetheless, there may be something to the majority’s reasoning, albeit 
Judge Leval clearly failed to develop the justification, and full implications, of 
the distinction he was drawing. Going back to Spence, remember that at least in 
the context of expressive conduct, the Court has suggested that the First 
Amendment protects only activity which includes three elements: a speaker, an 
intended message, and a likely audience.93 Clearly much religious speech held 
                                                                                                                     
 86 Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 37. 
 87 Id. at 52–65 (Walker, J., dissenting).  
 88 Id. at 56. 
 89 Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981)). 
 90 Id. at 57. 
 91 Id. at 37 (majority opinion). 
 92 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 13, 15, 29 (2012) (recounting numerous instances in which courts labeled 
disclosure of data as “conduct” to avoid First Amendment issues); Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 
613–14 (describing cases where courts labeled contribution of funds to terrorist groups as 
conduct, even though contributions to political candidates have been designated protected 
association). 
 93 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam). 
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to be protected by the First Amendment, including proselytizing,94 commenting 
on public issues from a religious perspective,95 and religious education,96 easily 
satisfy those requirements. Prayer and worship, however, raise difficult 
questions. Sometimes these activities, when engaged in by groups, are at least 
to some degree intended to send messages within the group, or even to outside 
observers. But both prayer and worship can also be solitary activities, in which 
circumstances there is no intended human audience—the intended “audience” 
presumably is a deity, but a court applying the Constitution surely cannot treat 
this as an act of communication without adopting highly problematic theological 
assumptions. Moreover, even when prayer and worship are conducted jointly 
and/or in public, determining the extent to which, if at all, the participants intend 
to express a message to other people is extremely difficult, and quickly descends 
into a theological quagmire. In this sense, then, the Bronx Household IV 
majority may be on to something in suggesting that a worship service might be 
meaningfully different from other forms of religious speech. 
Though then again, perhaps not. To say that prayer and worship are different 
from, say, proselytizing, does not answer whether they should be within the 
coverage of the Free Speech Clause. Prayer and worship are of course within 
the coverage of the Free Exercise Clause, but given the Court’s evisceration of 
Free Exercise protections in Employment Division v. Smith,97 that does not buy 
plaintiffs much—which is no doubt the reason why the Free Speech Clause has 
become the primary source of constitutional protection for religious activities. 
First of all, to determine whether the word “speech” in the First Amendment 
encompasses such arguably noncommunicative uses of language as (some) 
prayer and worship, we need a theory of the First Amendment. And as noted 
earlier, that is something the Court has yet to articulate or adopt. Second, even 
if noncommunicative prayer falls outside the First Amendment, this does not 
mean that the New York SOP successfully targets unprotected activity, as we 
shall see in Part V. 
B. Private Diaries and Intrapersonal Communication 
Many people keep diaries. Some of those diaries are—overly 
optimistically—intended for history (i.e., a future audience), while others are 
                                                                                                                     
 94 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); Lovell v. City of 
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452–53 (1938). 
 95 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 
(1995). 
 96 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001); Lamb’s 
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–97 (1993). 
 97 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (holding that generally applicable 
laws which incidentally burden religious exercise raise no Free Exercise issues). 
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meant to be shared with therapists or others. But often diaries are meant to be 
private, meaning for the eyes and benefit of the diarist alone. 
Similarly, many people speak out loud to themselves.98 Indeed, the 
phenomenon is sufficiently common that it has generated a name—intrapersonal 
communication99—and a substantial literature.100 As with private diaries, such 
speech is not directed at others, and is usually not intended to be heard. Rather, 
as with private diaries, the function of speaking to oneself appears to be to 
organize one’s thoughts and (in the case of diaries) ensure that thoughts are not 
forgotten. Are these activities protected by the First Amendment? 
I freely admit that the question posed here is largely a thought experiment. 
Actual prosecution for the contents of a private diary seems unlikely, since the 
most likely candidate would presumably be obscenity law but Stanley v. 
Georgia would seem to preclude such a prosecution.101 Intrapersonal 
communication might conceivably trigger prosecution if done in public and 
unintentionally overheard, but the possibility seems remote. Nonetheless, 
exploring the question is useful because it sheds important light on the 
relationship between the First Amendment and language. 
As with prayer, whether the First Amendment protects private diaries and 
intrapersonal communication turns on whether the word “speech” in the First 
Amendment refers to language, or to communication. The answer, however, is 
not self-evident. Certainly, one natural meaning of “speech” could be all uses of 
language. But another, equally plausible and widely held understanding is that 
speech is communication, requiring both a speaker and an intended audience 
(albeit the audience need not be immediately present, as in the case of books or 
other recorded expression). And again, absent a theory of the First Amendment, 
it is far from clear how one is to make that choice. 
C. Net Neutrality 
In March of 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
released what is generally labeled the 2015 Open Internet Order.102 The Order 
                                                                                                                     
 98 I am focusing here on individuals who do not suffer from mental illness such as 
schizophrenia, which raises complex and difficult questions beyond the scope of this Article. 
 99 Intrapersonal Communication, QUESTIA, https://www.questia.com/library/ 
communication/human-communication/intrapersonal-communication 
[https://perma.cc/Y3UZ-7Y6G]. 
 100 See e.g., INTRAPERSONAL COMMUNICATION: DIFFERENT VOICES, DIFFERENT MINDS 
(Donna R. Vocate ed., 1994) (collecting works from various authors on the subject of 
intrapersonal communication); Paul N. Campbell, Language as Intrapersonal and Poetic 
Process, 2 PHIL. & RHETORIC 200, 204–05 (1969); Patrick Jemmer, Intrapersonal 
Communication: The Hidden Language, 9 J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 37, 38 (2009). 
 101 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment 
prohibits prosecution for private possession of obscene materials in one’s home). 
 102 Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5601 (2015). 
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implemented a policy commonly known as “net neutrality.”103 The history of 
the FCC Order was long and complex and involved two previous attempts to 
adopt similar policies that had been struck down by the D.C. Circuit,104 none of 
which is terribly relevant for our purposes. The third time, however, was the 
charm, and on appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC Order by a two-to-one 
vote.105 Most of the decision turned on complex issues of statutory interpretation 
and telecommunications policy that are not pertinent to this Article.106 Our focus 
is on a claim brought by a handful of broadband providers that net neutrality 
violates the First Amendment.107 However, to understand the nature of the FCC 
Order and the D.C. Circuit’s First Amendment holding, some background is 
necessary. 
The starting point to understanding the Open Internet Order must be the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which amended the Communications Act of 
1934108 to adopt the statutory framework at issue in the FCC Order.109 The Act 
distinguishes sharply between two sorts of services offered by 
telecommunications providers: “telecommunications services” and 
“information services.”110 The former constitutes what is at heart transparent 
transmission between two points of information chosen by the customer, while 
the latter typically involves some sort of information processing by the 
telecommunications provider.111 Crucially, the Telecommunications Act 
subjects telecommunication services to so-called common carrier regulation, 
meaning in essence that the provider must offer services to all comers, and may 
not unjustly discriminate among customers or with respect to the services it 
provides.112 Information services, in contrast, are exempt from common carrier 
and most other regulations.113 
The overarching statutory question underlying the net neutrality debate 
concerns how broadband Internet access services should be classified under 
the Act. Broadband providers connect Internet end users to the Internet 
                                                                                                                     
 103 See id. at 5607, 5613. 
 104 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 
600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Under the Trump Administration, the FCC has 
announced its intention to repeal its net neutrality rules. See generally Restoring Internet 
Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568 (proposed June 2, 2017) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 
20).  
 105 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 106 See id. at 690–739. 
 107 Id. at 740–44. 
 108 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56. 
 109 U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 745 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 110 Id. at 691 (majority opinion) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2012)). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.  
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backbone network—a worldwide web of fiber optic cables that eventually 
connects the users to “edge providers,” meaning websites such as Amazon 
and Netflix.114 Almost all residential customers receive broadband service 
from either their cable company via cable modem service, or their telephone 
carrier via digital subscriber line (DSL) service.115 Large-scale users can also 
obtain broadband service via dedicated fiber optic lines.116 When broadband 
services in the form of DSL first became available, the FCC classified DSL 
services as a telecommunications service, subjecting it to onerous 
regulation.117 A few years later, however, the FCC classified cable modem 
service as an information service.118 After the Supreme Court upheld that 
decision,119 the FCC reclassified DSL and other forms of broadband, 
including mobile broadband provided by cellular telephone companies, as 
information services.120 
Enter net neutrality. The basic concern driving net neutrality is that 
broadband providers, because they possess substantial market power and 
control bottlenecks that end users must pass through to access the Internet, 
can use their power to interfere with an open Internet where end users and 
edge providers can communicate with each other without interference or 
preferentialism.121 To prevent that, the FCC’s net neutrality rules in the Open 
Internet Order prohibit broadband providers from blocking access to 
particular websites, slowing down access to particular websites, or engaging 
in “paid prioritization” whereby broadband providers favor some Internet 
traffic over other traffic in exchange for compensation.122 The rules also 
impose general prohibitions on broadband providers, forbidding them from 
interfering with either end users’ abilities to access lawful content, or edge 
providers’ abilities to offer lawful content.123 
 
                                                                                                                     
 114 Id. at 690. 
 115 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 690. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Id. at 691–92 (citing Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. 
Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24011, ¶¶ 3, 35–36 (1998)). 
 118 Id. at 692 (citing Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable 
and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, ¶¶ 39–40 (2002)). 
 119 See generally Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 1002–03 (2005) (upholding FCC decision to classify cable services as information 
services). 
 120 U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 692–93. 
 121 See Larry Downes, The Tangled Web of Net Neutrality and Regulation, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Mar. 31, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-tangled-web-of-net-neutrality-and-
regulation [https://perma.cc/2RLG-8RGT]. 
 122 U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 696. 
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When the FCC first tried to impose net-neutrality-type restrictions on 
broadband providers in 2007 (in an enforcement action against Comcast), 
the D.C. Circuit rejected its efforts on the grounds that the FCC had not 
identified any statutory authority for its actions.124 In response, in 2010 the 
FCC adopted regulations imposing net neutrality requirements on 
broadband, but the D.C. Circuit again rejected its efforts.125 This time the 
court held that while the FCC had identified statutory authority for its 
rules,126 the impact of its rules was to impose common-carrier-like 
requirements on broadband providers, which was inconsistent with the 
FCC’s continuing classification of broadband as an information service.127 
Finally, therefore, in the 2015 Open Internet Order the FCC faced up to the 
inevitable and reclassified broadband service as a telecommunications 
service subject to common carrier requirements (though the FCC exempted 
broadband from many common carrier requirements such as network 
unbundling or price regulation).128 This in turn created the legal justification 
for imposing net neutrality rules on broadband.129 
The primary issues on appeal in the D.C. Circuit concerned the 
permissibility under administrative law principles of the FCC’s decisions to 
reclassify broadband as a telecommunications service, to exempt broadband 
from many common carrier requirements, and finally, to adopt the net neutrality 
rules themselves.130 Ultimately, a majority of the court (Judges Tatel and 
Srinivasan) voted to uphold the FCC Order, while Judge Williams dissented.131 
Tucked away at the end of the majority opinion, however, is a section addressing 
an interesting First Amendment challenge to the net neutrality rules brought by 
two broadband providers (Judge Williams did not address this issue).132 The 
providers argued that net neutrality violated broadband providers’ First 
Amendment right of editorial control “by forcing broadband providers to 
transmit speech with which they might disagree.”133 The majority rejected this 
position, essentially on the grounds that common carriers have always been 
subject to nondiscrimination rules, which have never been thought to raise First 
Amendment issues because those rules “affect a common carrier’s neutral 
                                                                                                                     
 124 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 125 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. at 650–59. 
 128 U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 695–96. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 689. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 740–44. 
 133 Id. at 740. 
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transmission of others’ speech, not a carrier’s communication of its own 
message.”134 
This simple analysis, however, was not really complete, as the majority 
acknowledged.135 The First Amendment has long been interpreted to protect 
not only a speaker’s choice of his or her own message, but also under certain 
circumstances the speaker’s editorial discretion to select what speech 
produced by others the editor wishes to convey.136 Thus in Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,137 the Court struck down a statute that required 
newspapers to publish a response by political candidates who had been 
attacked in the newspaper, holding that the statute burdened the newspapers’ 
editorial discretion.138 More on point, in the two Turner Broadcasting 
System v. FCC decisions, the Court acknowledged that “must-carry” 
obligations imposed by Congress on cable operators (and administered by 
the FCC) burdened cable operators’ First Amendment editorial rights.139 The 
“must-carry” rules were adopted for reasons very similar to the justification 
for net neutrality: to address concerns that cable operators would abuse their 
bottleneck control over consumer access to video programming to 
disadvantage a class of video programmers, over-the-air television 
broadcasters, who directly competed with cable operators.140 In response, 
Congress adopted legislation requiring most cable operators to dedicate up 
to one-third of their channel capacity to carry, free of charge, the signals of 
local television broadcast stations.141 Cable operators and programmers 
challenged the legislation as violating the First Amendment, and in response 
the Court acknowledged that the legislation burdened the editorial rights of 
cable operators by reducing the number of channels whose content they 
controlled (it also found that the rules burdened the speech rights of 
nonbroadcast cable programmers by reducing the number of channels 
available to them).142 Ultimately, the Court rejected the challenge because it 
concluded that the must-carry rules were content neutral,143 and survived 
                                                                                                                     
 134 U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 740. 
 135 See id. at 743. 
 136 Id. at 742.  
 137 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
 138 Id.  
 139 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 214 (1997); Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 662, 636–37 (1994). 
 140 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 646. 
 141 Id. at 630–32. 
 142 Id. at 644–45. The legislation, and litigation, occurred during the era of analog cable 
television, when channel capacity was relatively limited. The move to digital cable has 
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 143 Id. at 652. 
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intermediate scrutiny.144 Importantly, however, because the Court 
acknowledged that must-carry regulations implicated the First Amendment, 
it reached its ultimate conclusion only after an extensive factual inquiry into 
the merits of the legislation,145 and over the votes of four dissenting Justices 
who believed the rules did not satisfy even intermediate scrutiny.146 
The tension between the Turner decisions and the majority’s First 
Amendment analysis in the D.C. Circuit’s net neutrality litigation should be 
clear. Both litigations raised claims of First Amendment editorial rights by 
owners of a new telecommunications technology used primarily to transmit 
content provided by others.147 In the Turner cases, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the existence of such rights, and so subjected the challenged 
regulation to close scrutiny.148 In United States Telecom Ass’n, the net neutrality 
case, the D.C. Circuit majority denied that any editorial rights were implicated, 
and so engaged in essentially no First Amendment scrutiny.149 Its primary 
justification for this, that broadband service (unlike cable television or 
newspapers) is a common carrier service,150 is entirely circular because 
remember, the very issue in the case was whether the First Amendment 
permitted broadband service to be reclassified as a common carrier service 
(which it had not been for most of its existence in the case of DSL, and all of its 
existence in the case of cable modem service). Surely the Turner dispute could 
not have been avoided if Congress or the FCC had announced, by ipse dixit, that 
cable operators were now common carriers. 
A more promising argument made by the D.C. Circuit majority was that 
broadband was distinguishable from cable (and newspapers) because it does not 
face the same sorts of capacity constraints and so providers are not forced to 
exercise editorial discretion.151 That is true enough, but also I think, inadequate. 
Certainly one reason why a speaker may exercise editorial discretion is to decide 
what content should occupy limited space; but another entirely separate reason 
is that the speaker may not wish to be associated with, or otherwise aid, 
particular speech. The former consideration is tied to capacity constraints, but 
the latter is not. The government presumably cannot force me to put up a 
political sign of its choice in my lawn, or for that matter a political banner on 
my website, even if I cannot prove that the requirement has displaced other 
speech of my choice. Similarly, is it truly impossible to imagine a broadband 
                                                                                                                     
 144 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224–25. 
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 146 Id. at 229–58 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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provider who generally allows access to all websites, but chooses to block 
access to white supremacist, or Jihadist sites? 
Note that these examples also demonstrate that the majority’s related 
argument, that broadband operators historically have not chosen to limit 
customers’ access to websites,152 also fails because it ignores the possibility that 
a conduit provider may generally be agnostic about the speech it carries, but still 
object to a few ideological exceptions. More fundamentally, this argument 
ignores the fact that what the plaintiffs in the net neutrality litigation were 
seeking was the right and ability to block or disadvantage Internet traffic of their 
choice (or conversely, to favor specific traffic of their choice). 
Finally, the majority argued that no editorial rights were at stake here 
because outsiders would not normally impute traffic carried by a broadband 
provider to the provider, and so the providers are not truly “speaking” when 
they carry traffic.153 Again, this argument is facially attractive, but 
ultimately cannot carry the day. For one thing, this assertion, while true 
enough, utterly fails to distinguish Turner, since it seems highly dubious that 
viewers attribute the content of the cable programming they view to their 
cable operator. Surely Comcast does not want to be seen as endorsing CNN, 
Fox News, MSNBC, and the pornography it offers on demand! In addition, 
cases confirm that the First Amendment protects not only a right not to 
speak, but also a right not to advance or support speech with which one 
disagrees. Otherwise, cases such as Knox v. Service Employees International 
Union154 and United States v. United Foods, Inc.,155 holding that the First 
Amendment forbids at least some mandatory financial assessments used to 
fund speech, make no sense. It is very hard to believe that observers would 
have imputed to the nonunion employees in Knox the political speech of the 
public sector unions they were required to contribute to, given that they had 
refused to join those same unions.156 Nonetheless, the Court still upheld 
those employees’ right to insist that their contributions not be used for 
political speech or activities.157 In doing so, it confirmed that the right at 
issue was the right to resist “compelled funding of the speech of other private 
speakers or groups,”158 not the right to refuse to speak for oneself. 
Ultimately, then, the First Amendment conundrum posed by net neutrality 
rules is unresolvable through the application of extant doctrine. Just as we have 
no existing tools to determine what uses of language constitute “speech,” or who 
is a “speaker,” we also have no way to determine who should be treated as an 
“editor” for First Amendment purposes. These kinds of judgments cannot be 
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 154 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295–96 (2012). 
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made based on some abstract notion of what the phrase “freedom of speech” 
means, because there is no reason to believe that the word speech has one single 
meaning, appropriate in all circumstances. Instead, we need a definition of 
“speech” for First Amendment purposes. In the next Part, I will argue that this 
conundrum is implicated by some communicative uses of language, in addition 
to the noncommunicative uses discussed above. 
IV. COMMUNICATIVE “SPEECH” (?) 
Even if the First Amendment might exclude some noncommunicative uses 
of language or (in the net neutrality context) forms of editorial discretion, this 
still does not undermine the Court’s existing assumption that all communicative 
speech is at least presumptively protected by the Constitution. In this Part I will 
discuss some examples of expressive activity which, I will tentatively suggest, 
might despite the fact that they satisfy the Spence test nonetheless be unworthy 
of constitutional protection. 
A. Personal Data 
One of the most difficult issues facing legislators and regulators over the 
next few years concerns potential disclosure or sale of personal data regarding 
private individuals, collected as a consequence of those individuals’ use of 
online services.159 The range of such data is huge, encompassing purchasing 
histories at websites such as Amazon; the content of emails scanned by Google 
when using Gmail, or by Apple when using an Apple device; lists of friends and 
acquaintances gathered by social networks such as Facebook or Instagram; lists 
of professional connections gathered by networking sites such as LinkedIn; and 
video viewing histories gathered by companies such as YouTube and Netflix.160 
Being able to put together combinations of such data would permit possessors 
to know essentially every personal and professional detail of an individual’s life. 
Leaving aside the serious Fourth Amendment concerns raised when the 
government seeks to access such data, there are also obvious and profound 
privacy concerns raised when companies gather, store, and sell such data. 
                                                                                                                     
 159 See Brian Fung, What To Expect Now that Internet Providers Can Collect and Sell 
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Should the government be able to restrict such activities, absent truly 
compelling reasons such as national security or the like? 
Surprisingly, if one applies the Supreme Court’s current First Amendment 
doctrine, the answer to that question appears to be “no.” I, and others, have 
analyzed this issue in depth elsewhere,161 and so I will briefly summarize here. 
While the Supreme Court has not definitively answered the question of whether 
the sale of data constitutes protected speech for First Amendment purposes, the 
one time it faced the issue it strongly hinted that it was.162 The issue in the 
Sorrell v. IMS Health case was the constitutionality of a Vermont statute that 
forbade pharmacies from selling data regarding the prescribing habits of doctors 
if such information was to be used by pharmaceutical companies for marketing 
purposes.163 The Court ultimately resolved the case (against Vermont) on 
narrow grounds, invoking the “commercial speech” doctrine.164 The Court did, 
however, consider and reject an argument made by Vermont (and endorsed by 
the First Circuit in another case) that the sale of prescriber-identifying data was 
equivalent to the sale of a commodity such as “beef jerky,” and so could be 
freely regulated.165 The Court’s response was that “the creation and 
dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First 
Amendment” because “[f]acts . . . are the beginning point for much of the 
speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct 
human affairs.”166 And nowhere in that response was there any hint that the 
Court attributed any relevance to the fact that the “facts” here were data about 
the habits of private individuals.167 
The Court’s analysis (probably dictum) in Sorrell, moreover, is consistent 
with recent doctrinal developments. The sale of data is a communicative 
activity, since data communicates facts. Nor is there any historically recognized 
“exception” to the First Amendment for personal data.168 Therefore, under 
Stevens and Brown, the sale of personal data is fully protected speech. Second, 
regulations of data disclosure are necessarily content based, because they 
specify what types of data may not be disclosed. Therefore, under Reed, such 
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 163 Id. at 558–59. 
 164 Id. at 571–72. 
 165 Id. at 570 (citing IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 166 Id. (citation omitted). 
 167 See id.  
 168 See Schauer, supra note 4, at 1774–77. 
 
864 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:4 
laws are subject to strict scrutiny. And as noted earlier, such scrutiny is almost 
always fatal in the First Amendment realm.169  
 
But this cannot be correct. In the modern information economy, 
information, which is to say personal data, is perhaps the key commodity being 
traded by firms and individuals. For technology firms, the importance of data is 
obvious—data is central to the business model of many of the largest modern 
firms, including Google, Facebook, and increasingly, Amazon. For individuals 
it is no less significant. After all, I “pay” Google and Facebook for free service 
by exchanging my personal data for their services.170 To conclude that the First 
Amendment forbids essentially all economic regulation of such transactions 
returns to the age of Lochner with a vengeance.171 But that is where the Court 
appears to be leading us. 
B. Revenge Porn 
Revenge porn is a thoroughly vile recent development in which former 
boyfriends or husbands (the perpetrators are almost always male)172 post 
onto the Internet nude or revealing images of their former partners, which 
had in most cases been voluntarily shared with them during the 
relationship.173 Several operators of dedicated revenge porn websites have 
been successfully prosecuted, but generally on charges unrelated to the 
revenge porn itself.174 In recent years, a number of states and foreign 
countries have adopted statutes specifically criminalizing revenge porn, and 
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this legislative trend appears to be gathering force.175 The interesting 
question for our purposes is whether, in the United States, the First 
Amendment permits such restrictions.176 
As with data, the short and troubling answer is that current First 
Amendment doctrine almost certainly protects revenge porn. Andrew 
Koppelman has recently, and convincingly, laid out why this is so,177 but the 
analysis is for us a familiar one. Revenge porn usually is not unprotected 
speech. It will rarely qualify as “obscenity” under the strict Miller 
standard,178 and as Koppelman points out there is no other historically 
established exception that can plausibly be said to extend to revenge 
porn179—a result consistent with the Supreme Court’s unfailing extension in 
recent years of full protection to nonobscene sexual speech.180 So, Stevens 
and Brown again decree that revenge porn is fully protected speech. Finally, 
revenge porn statutes are inevitably content based, and indeed arguably 
viewpoint based, because they specify what sorts of images are banned.181 
So, once again, Reed decrees strict scrutiny. And while the governmental 
interest in protecting the privacy of revenge porn victims is certainly strong, 
history suggests that this will not be enough to permit suppression of revenge 
porn. In particular, in two cases in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court was faced 
with challenges to statutes banning the publication of the names of victims 
of sexual assault (the victims or their families had relied on these statutes to 
bring civil damages actions against media outlets).182 In both cases, the 
media won before the Supreme Court, largely because the media defendants 
in both cases had obtained the information legally.183 The difficulty, of 
course, is that in a typical revenge porn scenario the images at issue were 
voluntarily shared, and so obtained legally. Admittedly, in the more recent 
of these cases the Court did rely in part on the notion that the information 
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conveyed was “a matter of public significance”;184 but as Koppelman points 
out, this principle has never been applied by the Court to uphold content-
based, much less viewpoint-based laws, as revenge porn statutes arguably 
are.185 Moreover, in recent years the Court has, if anything, moved away 
from the notion that the First Amendment gives special protection to speech 
with high social value.186 Precedent therefore suggests that, as in most cases, 
bans on revenge porn are unlikely to be able to survive strict scrutiny. 
C. Products Liability 
Another example of speech which is communicative but which nonetheless 
we do not treat as “speech” for First Amendment purposes can be found in the 
area of products liability. Many products liability claims such as, for example, 
claims against makers of defective brakes, of course raise no First Amendment 
concerns. But some products liability and negligence claims, even outside the 
sphere of malpractice (which I discuss next), are in fact based on words. Fred 
Schauer gives the example of “whether a chainsaw manufacturer may be held 
liable in a products liability action for injuries caused by mistakes in the written 
instructions accompanying the tool.”187 Robert Post mentions inaccurate 
navigation charts, and cites cases treating such charts as “products” rather than 
speech, even though they are clearly communicative.188 And of course tort 
liability for failure to warn, especially in the context of prescription drugs, is 
very common.189 All these examples involve imposing liability for the content 
of speech (or failure to speak), and so seemingly implicate the First Amendment. 
And yet no one seems to take seriously even the possibility of a First 
Amendment defense in such cases.190 Why? 
Current doctrine cannot answer that question. Certainly the “commercial 
speech” doctrine is no help here, for two distinct reasons. First, navigational 
charts are not commercial speech, they are a communicative product that is sold 
in the market, just like the New York Times. And even faulty instructions do not 
seem to be commercial speech, since they not qualify as “speech which does ‘no 
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more than propose a commercial transaction.’”191 Second, under modern law, 
commercial speech is not entirely outside the First Amendment; to the contrary, 
it receives quite extensive constitutional protection.192 So, the commercial 
speech doctrine cannot explain why the First Amendment “does not even show 
up” in these products liability cases.193 
Second, the fact that the speech that provides the basis for liability in these 
cases is arguably false or misleading is also not sufficient to explain these cases. 
In a recent decision in the Stevens/Brown line, the Court has made clear that 
outside the context of commercial speech regulation, false or misleading speech 
does not stand wholly outside the First Amendment, because there is no 
historical tradition of treating all false speech as categorically unprotected.194 
As with the professional speech cases discussed next, perhaps such liability can 
ultimately be justified, especially because the exact level of protection for false 
and misleading speech remains uncertain; but current doctrine cannot explain 
why no First Amendment analysis is required, as most people (and courts) seem 
to assume. 
D. Professional Speech 
Finally, consider professional speech. The practice of many professions, 
including medicine, law, and psychiatric counseling, consists to a large degree 
of professionals providing clients with expert advice through speech, either oral 
or written. And for as long as these professions have been subject to regulation, 
professionals have been disciplined by regulators for incompetence or 
negligence in providing such professional advice.195 Furthermore, professionals 
have also been subject to malpractice liability to their clients for most of our 
history.196 Such regulation of the professions had never, until recently, been 
thought to raise any significant First Amendment issues. As recently as 1992, 
the Supreme Court, in an important abortion decision, brusquely dismissed a 
First Amendment challenge to regulation of physicians’ speech because the 
speech at issue was a “part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable 
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licensing and regulation by the State.”197 And numerous cases hold that the First 
Amendment does not bar licensing requirements for professionals who speak as 
part of their profession.198 Recently, however, professional speech regulation 
has generated substantial controversy. 
The largest set of disputes regarding professional speech have involved 
so-called “conversion therapy.”199 Conversion therapy is a form of 
counseling, including “aversive and non-aversive treatments,” designed to 
“change an individual’s orientation from homosexual to heterosexual.”200 It 
has been widely condemned in recent years, and remains highly 
controversial.201 In 2012, California adopted legislation prohibiting licensed 
mental health professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors, 
and defining the provision of such therapy as unprofessional conduct.202 Two 
different sets of providers challenged the legislation, leading to diverging 
results in the district courts.203 The Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld the 
California statute, concluding that because it regulated the provision of 
professional treatment, the statute was actually a regulation of conduct, not 
speech.204 This conclusion, however, drew a vociferous dissent when the 
court denied rehearing en banc, on the grounds that speech by professionals, 
though perhaps entitled to less protection than political speech, should not 
and cannot (consistent with Supreme Court precedent) be placed entirely 
beyond the protection of the First Amendment.205 
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There seems little doubt that as a doctrinal matter, the dissent has the 
better of the argument. Providing professional advice is literally speech as it 
is undoubtedly a communicative use of language, even if in a professional 
context. And there is no existing category of unprotected speech that seems 
relevant to the dispute. As such, it is hard to say, consistent with Stevens and 
Brown, how the majority justified granting conversion therapy no First 
Amendment protection at all. Indeed, when faced with a constitutional 
challenge to a New Jersey statute banning conversion therapy, this is 
precisely what the Third Circuit said when it flatly rejected the Ninth 
Circuit’s conclusion that conversion therapy bans do not implicate free 
speech at all.206 Ultimately, however, the Third Circuit upheld the 
conversion therapy ban, concluding that professional speech should receive 
less protection than fully protected political speech, and that the New Jersey 
statute survived intermediate scrutiny.207 
Regulation of professional speech is the topic of another, even more 
high-profile recent litigation, regarding Florida’s infamous “Docs vs. 
Glocks” legislation.208 This law prohibits health care professionals from 
keeping records concerning their patients’ gun ownership, and more broadly 
prevents them from even inquiring regarding gun ownership by patients or 
their families absent special circumstances.209 A group of physicians sued, 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute on various grounds, including 
a free speech claim.210 The plaintiffs succeeded in their First Amendment 
claim in the district court.211 Then came utter chaos. In a series of decisions, 
a panel of the Eleventh Circuit originally reversed, repeatedly. In its first 
opinion, the court (by a two-to-one vote) held that the law was permissible 
because it merely regulated professional conduct.212 Then on rehearing, the 
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same panel (by the same vote) applied intermediate scrutiny, concluding that 
this was the appropriate standard for professional speech regulations, but 
again upheld the law.213 Finally, the same panel, again by the same vote, sua 
sponte reconsidered and revised the second opinion.214 In the third and final 
panel opinion, the majority applied strict scrutiny to the Florida law.215 
Astonishingly, however, the panel concluded that the statute survived strict 
scrutiny because of the State’s compelling interest in protecting the rights of 
gun owners, and so upheld the ban.216 The Eleventh Circuit then granted en 
banc review and vacated the panel opinions.217 Finally, on February 16, 
2017, the en banc Eleventh Circuit held that the Florida legislation did 
violate the First Amendment.218 But again, the procedural confusion did not 
end. First, the en banc court produced not one, but two majority opinions 
(the primary opinion applying substantive First Amendment analysis, the 
second the void-for-vagueness doctrine).219 Further, the first (and primary) 
majority en banc opinion was studiously ambiguous about what level of 
scrutiny it was applying.220 It described the challenged provisions as 
“speaker-focused and content-based restrictions,” seemingly forecasting 
strict scrutiny analysis.221 But then the court fudged, stating that it need not 
decide if strict scrutiny applies, because the Florida law’s provisions “fail 
even under heightened scrutiny as articulated in Sorrell [v. IMS Health 
Inc.] . . . .”222 This is a little peculiar because Sorrell was decided under the 
commercial speech doctrine, and if there is one thing that is clear, it is that 
Florida was not regulating commercial speech. But, since most people 
understand the commercial speech doctrine to be a species of intermediate 
scrutiny, presumably the majority was assuming (without deciding) that that 
was the appropriate standard of review for professional speech regulations.  
Even this assumption invoked a separate concurrence by two judges arguing 
that strict scrutiny should apply,223 and a dissenting opinion defending 
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intermediate scrutiny, but finding it satisfied (and along the way sharply 
criticizing the Supreme Court’s Reed decision).224 
If there is one thing that the Florida litigation makes crystal clear, it is the 
extraordinary uncertainty and confusion surrounding the constitutional status of 
professional speech. Three sequential opinions by the same panel, each applying 
a different standard of review, is unheard of but nicely illustrates the confusion 
evinced by the two conversion therapy cases. Equally telling is the final 
Eleventh Circuit panel’s decision to apply strict scrutiny in a case where the law 
was ultimately upheld—a decision that appears to have been driven at least in 
part by concerns about the scope of Reed.225 And this despite the fact that the 
Eleventh Circuit panel recognized the long and uncontroversial history of the 
regulation of professions.226 Then came the final, en banc opinion, in which the 
majority refused or could not agree on a clear standard of review, and the dissent 
confessed to seeking direct strategies to “narrow Reed’s scope” in order to avoid 
strict scrutiny.227 In few areas is the expansionary force of the Court’s recent 
decisions more evident than with regard to professional speech.228 
V. WHEN SPEECH IS “SPEECH” 
As noted earlier, the underlying assumption of the Court’s modern free 
expression doctrine, including the Spence “test” defining expressive conduct,229 
is that all uses of language constitute protected speech.230 The examples 
discussed in the previous two Parts demonstrate, however, that this assumption 
cannot be correct. To the contrary, the inescapable conclusion they point to is 
that the word “speech” as used in the First Amendment does not match the 
colloquial meaning of that word. This Part of the Article begins the task of 
defining the word “speech” for First Amendment purposes in a way that can be 
tied to the history and text of the First Amendment. 
To frame the issue, we can begin by considering the problem of 
noncommunicative speech, including solitary prayer, intrapersonal 
communication, and private diaries. Are such uses of language within the 
coverage of the First Amendment? Recall that in the realm of conduct, the Court 
has said that conduct is expressive, and so falls within the scope of the First 
Amendment, only if “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, 
                                                                                                                     
 224 Wollschlaeger IV, 848 F.3d at 1330–38 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 225 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1192 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated 
and reh’g en banc granted, 649 F. App’x 647 (11th Cir. 2016) (mem), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 226 Id. at 1190–92. 
 227 Wollschlaeger IV, 848 F.3d at 1333–34 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 228 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 229 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 230 See supra notes 22–66 and accompanying text. 
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and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”231 This test necessarily limits 
First Amendment coverage to communicative conduct, because most people 
would agree that regulations of noncommunicative conduct raise no First 
Amendment issues.232 But should that same restriction be carried over to 
regulations of language? As noted above, this question cannot be answered 
based on an abstract definition of the word “speech.” If it can be answered, it 
must be through attention to the specific context in which the word appears in 
the First Amendment. 
Attention to context must begin by noting the constitutional text, and in 
particular the fact that the Free Speech Clause does not appear in isolation. The 
First Amendment, in whole, reads as follows: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”233 
The Free Speech Clause is thus combined with a number of other 
provisions: the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Press 
Clause, the Assembly Clause, and the Petition Clause.234 We will set aside the 
Religion Clauses (Establishment and Free Exercise) because, as I have 
explained in greater detail elsewhere, their drafting history demonstrates that the 
framing generation considered them to be quite distinct from the other, what I 
call democratic rights of the First Amendment.235 Indeed, the Religion Clauses 
were not combined with the rest of the First Amendment until September 9, 
1789, very late in the drafting process, when the Senate did so without 
explanation.236 The other rights, however, have always been associated with 
each other.237 Speech and press are part of the same provision, and right next to 
the provision protecting assembly and petition, both in George Mason’s master 
draft of the Bill of Rights (where protections for religion notably were not 
juxtaposed with the democratic rights),238 and in James Madison’s original 
                                                                                                                     
 231 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. 
 232 Contra C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964, 992–94, 1009–12 (1978) (arguing that the First Amendment should 
protect conduct that advances First Amendment values). 
 233 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 234 Id. 
 235 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the 
Instrumental Value of Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 92–93 (2014). 
 236 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 5–
6 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
 237 See id. at 148. 
 238 George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, CONST. SOC’Y, ¶¶ 15, 16, 20 
(Sept. 17, 1999) [hereinafter Mason’s Master Draft], http://www.constitution.org/gmason/ 
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proposed Bill of Rights to Congress.239 The democratic rights were combined 
into one provision quite early in the drafting process, in late July at the latest,240 
and were therefore considered together throughout most of the debates. More 
recently, the Supreme Court has described these rights as “cognate” rights, with 
common origins and common purposes.241 Given this history, any interpretation 
of the word “speech” in the First Amendment must take into account this 
connection to other democratic rights of the First Amendment. 
When one looks at these other rights—freedom of the press, assembly, and 
petition—what leaps out is their similarities. All are joint activities requiring 
multiple actors, all have some expressive element to them, and most 
importantly, all are fundamentally political in the sense that they are closely tied 
to democratic citizenship. Even the least “expressive” of the democratic rights, 
assembly, is clearly a political one, as demonstrated by the fact that the original 
wording of this right in both Mason’s and Madison’s proposals was a right of 
the people “peaceably to assemble together to consult for their common 
good.”242 That the Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses serve fundamentally 
democratic and political functions is a proposition I have defended extensively 
elsewhere,243 and I will not reiterate the arguments here except to note that the 
background, text, and drafting history leave no serious doubts on this score. That 
these rights are collective in nature is equally obvious. The printing press is a 
tool to communicate views to others. Assembly is necessarily collective since 
one person standing alone is obviously not an assembly. Petitions are written 
requests directed to others (government officials), and historically often written 
and presented in collaboration with others (fellow citizens).244 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
amd_gmas.htm [https://perma.cc/6LNA-RZ3M]. Mason’s Master Draft provided the 
template for many of the state ratifying conventions’ recommendations for amendments, and 
also clearly was Madison’s starting point when he proposed amendments to Congress that 
eventually became the Bill of Rights. 
 239 Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 1789, CONST. SOC’Y, 
¶¶ 7–8 [hereinafter Amendments Offered by Madison], http://www.constitution.org/bor/ 
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 240 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 236, at 148. 
 241 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 
364 (1937). 
 242 Mason’s Master Draft, supra note 238, at ¶ 15; Amendments Offered by Madison, 
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 243 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1099–100 (2016). 
 244 RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE 86, 88 (2012). 
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The inference from all of this seems inescapable: like its “cognates,” speech 
as protected by the First Amendment is at heart a right to engage in joint political 
or democratic activity. Whatever the abstract meaning of the word speech, 
“speech” in the First Amendment is a right to communicate to others in one’s 
capacity as a democratic citizen. The speaker may have formulated the ideas she 
wishes to convey alone—though in truth, that is rarely going to be the case since 
most effective political participation is group based—but the core function of 
speech is to spread political ideas, and to organize political movements. It 
should be noted, however, that the word “political” should not be defined 
narrowly, as Robert Bork sought to,245 to encompass only speech directly 
related to elections or public policy issues. Scientific knowledge, cultural 
sharing and development, and more broadly the shaping of values are surely 
highly relevant to citizenship, especially if citizenship is defined more broadly 
than merely voting as the full text of the First Amendment suggests it must be.246 
More to the point, permitting the state to control the knowledge, culture, and 
values of its citizens is entirely inconsistent with the principle of popular 
sovereignty that underlies the American vision of democratic citizenship, and 
indeed the entire American political system. A further implication of this insight 
is that speech need not be “public” in the sense of directed at large audiences to 
fall within the class of speech relevant to citizenship. After all, citizens develop 
and share their political and cultural values at least as much through private 
conversations as through public discourse.247 This is not the place to fully 
explore these questions, and elucidate the complete range of speech protected 
under this approach to free speech,248 aside from recognizing that the coverage 
of the Free Speech Clause is capacious. 
But it is not unlimited. Even under this broad view, some forms of speech 
and some uses of language clearly are not “speech” under the definition set forth 
above. Most obviously, noncommunicative uses of language are not “speech.” 
It is not that these uses of language do not have value, either to individuals or to 
society—of course they do. Activities like solitary prayer, keeping a diary, and 
even speaking to oneself have obvious significance to human beings. They can 
also help shape the values of those engaging in such activities. But they are not 
the sorts of joint, democratic activities that constitute constitutional “speech.”249 
                                                                                                                     
 245 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 20 (1971). 
 246 For a fuller exposition of this proposition, see Bhagwat, supra note 243, at 1119–23. 
 247 The Supreme Court has, in the context of speech by government employees, 
recognized that private conversations can constitute speech relevant to democratic self-
governance. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 n.11 (1987); Givhan v. W. Line 
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414–16 (1979). 
 248 I plan to explore these questions in book-length form soon. 
 249 One caveat is necessary here. Sometimes, diaries or other kinds of memoranda are 
not intended for any audience, but might still be part of an author’s preparations in creating 
a communication such as an article or paper which is intended as a contribution to public 
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These activities are by definition not communicative at all, and so they do not 
contribute to democratic or cultural discussion or debate in even the broadest 
sense. In particular, the fact that noncommunicative language expresses and 
shapes values does not meaningfully distinguish it from many forms of clearly 
nonexpressive conduct, from running a marathon to participating in a quilting 
bee. These activities are important, and therefore sometimes protected by other 
constitutional provisions such as the Free Exercise Clause250 or the Fourth 
Amendment,251 but they are not protected by the Free Speech Clause. 
I recognize that this conclusion stands in sharp contrast to the position taken 
by others. Seana Shiffrin, for example, has explicitly argued that the First 
Amendment protects “diaries and other forms of discourse meant primarily for 
self-consumption,” and indeed describes this position as “highly intuitive.”252 
She uses this starting assumption as part of the basis for her rejection of 
democratic theories of free speech,253 and her adoption of a “thinker-based” 
approach instead under which the primary purpose of the Speech Clause is to 
advance an “individual agent’s interest in the protection of the free development 
and operation of her mind.”254 Shiffrin’s approach may well be a strong 
philosophical defense and basis for protecting free speech in the abstract, which 
is what I take her argument to be. But for the reasons stated above, I do not think 
it is an adequate basis to define constitutional “speech.” 
Neil Richards’s concept of “intellectual privacy” is similar to Shiffrin’s 
speaker-based approach.255 He defines intellectual privacy as “the ability, 
whether protected by law or social circumstances, to develop ideas and beliefs 
away from the unwanted gaze or interference of others,”256 and while he does 
not address noncommunicative language specifically, he does conclude that 
“[t]he First Amendment should protect cognitive activities even if they are 
wholly private and unshared because of the importance of individual conscience 
and autonomy.”257 Noncommunicative uses of language seem to fit comfortably 
                                                                                                                     
discourse. In that situation, while the diaries or notes are not themselves “speech” for First 
Amendment purposes, they may nonetheless be entitled to some level of penumbral 
protection as activities necessary for the production of speech. Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1055–57 (2015); see also KENT 
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 46 (1989). 
 250 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise 
[of religion] . . . .”). 
 251 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their . . . papers . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 252 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 285 & n.4 (2011). 
 253 Id. at 285–86, 285 n.6. 
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 255 See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008). 
 256 Id. at 389. 
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within that protection. Furthermore, Richards argues that his approach is 
consistent with democracy-based approaches to free speech because such 
theories assume the existence of “autonomous individuals.”258 Again, however, 
I disagree. 
Richards is of course correct that cognition is a necessary precursor to 
speech.259 And he is also correct that a democracy built on popular sovereignty 
requires citizens who are autonomous individuals.260 But the First Amendment 
has never been understood to protect either all precursors to speech,261 or all 
forms of autonomy that matter to citizens.262 Thus information acquisition is 
often an essential precursor to speech, but the First Amendment has not 
generally been thought to protect such activity.263 What the First Amendment 
protects are specific, collective activities that are tied to, and indeed form the 
essence of, democratic citizenship, and the Free Speech Clause focuses on the 
communicative aspects of such activities. This is not to say that a theory could 
not be constructed under which thinking and cognition receive protection as 
“penumbral” First Amendment rights because of their relationship to core First 
Amendment activities;264 but they are no more “speech” than buying a computer 
or shooting a gun,265 because they are themselves neither collective, nor 
communicative. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS: NONCOMMUNICATIVE SPEECH 
In the previous Part, I made arguments regarding what the Free Speech 
Clause does protect—collective, communicative activities relevant to 
                                                                                                                     
 258 Id. at 405. 
 259 Id.; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 249, at 46 (making a similar argument 
regarding cognition and speech). 
 260 Richards, supra note 255, at 405. 
 261 E.g., Bambauer, supra note 161, at 70–71, 77–79 (arguing that data collection is a 
precursor to speech, but is not protected by the First Amendment). 
 262 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 263 E.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects the communication of information, not access to that information); Pell 
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–34 (1974) (holding that the press does not have a right to 
special access to information unavailable to the public); cf. supra note 249 and 
accompanying text (arguing that noncommunicative private speech lacks democratic 
qualities that characterize constitutional “speech”). 
 264 Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
them life and substance.”). 
 265 Though as an essential tool for creating mass communications, using a computer 
might find protection in the Press Clause. See Bhagwat, supra note 249, at 1056–57. And, of 
course, shooting a gun will sometimes be protected by the Second Amendment. District of 
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democratic citizenship—and at least one example of what it does not, which is 
noncommunicative language. Of course, many difficult questions of coverage 
remain, including questions raised by the Bronx Household of Faith cases and 
by net neutrality policies. It is to these questions that we now turn. 
A. Worship Services 
Let us begin with the Bronx Household of Faith problem. Recall that in that 
case, the Second Circuit upheld a public school district’s rule prohibiting the 
use of school property after hours for “religious worship services”266 because 
the court concluded that the exclusion of a worship service merely prohibited a 
type of activity, and did not exclude worship itself or religious viewpoints.267 Is 
this result supported by the above analysis? I think not. As a starting point, the 
Second Circuit’s explicit suggestion—that while the school district can exclude 
worship services, it cannot exclude “[p]rayer . . . done by a person” acting 
alone—has things exactly upside down.268 A worship service is a collective 
activity, and so at least potentially “speech” if it is also expressive and relevant 
to democratic citizenship. Private prayer is not, and so presumably is not 
“speech.” But do worship services involve communication, and are they 
relevant to citizenship? 
Taking the second question first, the answer must be that of course worship 
services are relevant to citizenship. As discussed above, at a minimum 
democratic citizenship encompasses the collective expression and development 
of values and beliefs. Religious worship is a central aspect of such expression 
and development for many citizens, and so surely is tied closely enough to 
democratic self-governance to fall within the coverage of the Speech Clause. 
The first question, however, is closer. Not all worship services are centered on 
communication—Quaker services, for example, are mainly silent.269 Similarly, 
prior to Vatican II, Catholic services were conducted primarily in Latin,270 a 
language that almost no parishioners would have understood for centuries. On 
the other hand, most modern worship services are centrally about 
communication among attendees, including presiding ministers, and sometimes 
with the wider world—though they of course involve some noncommunicative 
elements as well. Ultimately, given the close relationship between worship and 
communication in most circumstances, it seems inescapable that excluding 
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worship services from schools does burden “speech,” not just an “activity.” At 
a minimum, excluding all worship services seems extraordinarily overbroad if 
the aim was to exclude only the noncommunicative aspects of worship services. 
Of course, this conclusion does not resolve the question of whether the exclusion 
is nonetheless constitutional because it advances the government’s interest in 
avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause; but that is an issue beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
B. Net Neutrality 
Now consider the net neutrality dispute. The question in that litigation was 
not whether the Open Internet Order burdened “speech” protected by the First 
Amendment, but whether it burdened editorial rights protected by the First 
Amendment.271 But the issues are similar in that they cannot be answered in the 
abstract. Instead, in resolving disputes over editorial rights, one must ask 
whether protecting editorial control under the specific circumstances at issue 
advances the democratic goals of the First Amendment. With the print media, 
the answer is clearly that protecting the editorial discretion of publishers is 
essential to democracy given the key institutional role of the print media as “one 
of the great bulwarks of liberty” (to quote the language of the Press Clause in 
James Madison’s original proposed constitutional amendments to Congress).272 
Moreover, given the important role that an ideological and partisan press has 
played in democratic debate through most of our history, editorial discretion is 
as important a contributor to democracy as is the right to print in the first place. 
Finally, today the same protections should surely extend to the editors of 
websites, including newspaper websites, that post materials relevant to 
democratic self-governance, since in the modern world such websites play a role 
analogous to that historically played by the print media (partisanship and all).273 
Net neutrality, however, is different. Unlike with religious worship and the 
Second Circuit, close analysis strongly supports the conclusion that the D.C. 
Circuit was correct to conclude that the First Amendment does not protect the 
editorial discretion of broadband providers.274 The fact that there is no history 
of broadband providers discriminating against specific content on ideological 
grounds strongly undermines the notion that granting such providers editorial 
discretion is needed to safeguard democracy. To the contrary, given that most 
individuals now rely primarily on the Internet to access information relevant to 
citizenship, and given the market power that broadband providers enjoy, 
granting such providers editorial control would undermine democracy by 
potentially interfering with citizens’ ability to speak, educate themselves, and 
                                                                                                                     
 271 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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organize. Finally, and most tellingly, the types of editorial discretion that 
broadband providers are seeking, and the motivations behind those efforts, have 
absolutely no relationship to democracy or citizenship. Broadband providers are 
seeking to block some websites, and to provide enhanced access to others, for 
technical and financial reasons, not ideological ones.275 When the net neutrality 
debate first reached the FCC, it was over Comcast’s blocking of peer-to-peer 
services because such services used disproportionate bandwidth, not because 
Comcast objected to their content.276 Similarly, in the 2015 Open Internet Order, 
the most controversial aspect of the FCC’s rules was a ban on paid prioritization, 
whereby providers provide some websites enhanced access to customers in 
exchange for compensation.277 Again, the broadband providers’ motives were 
purely to maximize profits, and they do not even allege an ideological 
component. To the contrary, a broadband provider who claims to block or favor 
content for ideological reasons would probably be committing economic 
suicide.278 For all these reasons, the “editorial discretion” sought by broadband 
providers is so far removed from, and indeed in conflict with, the democratic 
goals underlying the Speech and Press Clauses that it should be considered 
outside the coverage of the First Amendment.279 
VII. IMPLICATIONS: COMMUNICATIVE USES OF LANGUAGE 
Finally, it is time to consider the most controversial possible implication of 
my analysis, which is the possibility that certain types of communicative acts 
should be treated outside First Amendment coverage even if they do not fall 
within a historically defined category of unprotected speech. Once one 
acknowledges that not all uses of language constitute “speech” for constitutional 
purposes, does that insight really have to be limited to noncommunicative uses? 
Or might it be that some communicative activities are nonetheless so far 
removed from the purposes of the First Amendment that they do not constitute 
constitutional “speech,” as the discussion in Part IV might imply? 
I begin by addressing an obvious objection, that mine is a radical proposal 
and a historically unprecedented weakening of free speech protections. In truth, 
however, it is not. To begin with, it is important to note that the very idea that 
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only a few, historically defined categories of speech fall outside First 
Amendment protection is a very recent one. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
Stevens decision in 2010, it was almost universally assumed that the Court had 
the power to define new categories of unprotected speech based on a balancing 
analysis.280 But more fundamentally, an excellent, recent article by Genevieve 
Lakier demonstrates that the whole idea of a few, defined categories of low-
value speech is a modern invention.281 Prior to the Court’s 1942 decision in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,282 Lakier argues, the general presumption had 
been that all speech, including obscenity, was “protected” in the sense that it 
could not be subjected to prior restraints, but most speech could also generally 
be subjected to subsequent punishment if a minimal showing of public harm 
could be made.283 This was the law throughout the nineteenth century, and into 
the twentieth century until the New Deal Era.284 Notably, however, even during 
this period, courts recognized that not all speech was equal, and that certain 
kinds of speech—particularly speech on explicitly political issues such as the 
official conduct of public officials or speech touching on the public interest—
required a higher showing of harm to be punished.285 This concept, Lakier 
convincingly argues, provided the basis for Justice Holmes’s seminal dissent in 
Abrams v. United States, in which the Justice explicitly limited his newly beefed 
up “clear and present danger” test to “expressions of opinion and exhortations,” 
clearly a reference to politically oriented speech.286 The picture that emerges, 
then, is of a nuanced approach to First Amendment coverage in which all speech 
is covered for the purposes of the ban on prior restraints, but otherwise 
nonpolitical speech received minimal protection from subsequent punishment. 
Leaving aside prior restraints, the reading of the First Amendment pressed 
here has obvious and close parallels to Lakier’s historical analysis. Political 
speech receives substantial protection and can be punished only if the 
government can make a substantial showing of harm,287 while speech far from 
the First Amendment’s goals receives much more limited protection, perhaps 
no more than that provided by the “rational basis” test applicable to all 
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regulations that impinge on liberty.288 The primary difference is that in an earlier 
era the concept of “political” was narrowly defined,289 but my approach takes a 
much broader view. This is consistent with modern law’s realization that the 
distinction between “politics” and “entertainment,” or perhaps more accurately 
between “politics” and “culture,” is simply untenable, a point that the Court has 
recognized in cases such as Winters v. New York290 and Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n.291 Cultural values, religious values, and political values are 
inextricably intertwined, and therefore in a democratic system based on popular 
sovereignty, all must be beyond the government’s reach. But, contrary to the 
modern Court’s view, none of this requires a conclusion that all acts of 
communication receive such heightened scrutiny, and so fall within the 
coverage of modern doctrine. 
Let us begin with an easy example: commercial sales or sharing of personal 
data. There is no doubt that such transactions are communicative in the sense 
that they share information. As such, they seem to be speech by any commonly 
used definition. But the sale of personal data usually has no connection at all to 
political or cultural values, to democratic citizenship, or to political activities, 
no matter how broadly defined. Therefore, there seems no reason to prevent the 
state from regulating such sales as long as some minimal showing of public 
harm can be made—a requirement surely satisfied by identifying privacy 
interests to be protected. It should be emphasized that this does not mean all 
information, or even all data, falls outside the First Amendment’s coverage. 
Much data, including scientific data, aggregated data about individual habits, 
and even personal information about public officials and figures,292 is surely 
relevant to public policy and culture, and so must be fully protected. Similarly, 
data such as voter and donor lists, which have obvious ties to the political 
process, also certainly fall within First Amendment coverage. But even under 
the broadest view of the word political, it is hard to see how personal 
information about, for example, private individuals’ shopping habits, used to 
sell targeted advertising, has any connection to citizenship or democracy. 
Revenge porn, at least as used to victimize private figures, seems almost 
as strong a case for nonprotection. Revenge porn is undoubtedly 
communicative. But the motives behind it, and the impact it has on 
individual victims, have essentially nothing to do with political or cultural 
                                                                                                                     
 288 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938). 
 289 Lakier, supra note 281, at 2194–95. 
 290 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
 291 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). 
 292 A good example of such protected data would be the personal information regarding 
the appearances of police officers who participated in a lineup, at issue in Dahlstrom v. Sun-
Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 2015). The court upheld the restriction on 
disclosure in Dahlstrom on the very dubious theory that the law at issue was content-neutral. 
Id. at 949–50. But that is a different story. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content 
Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1445–46 (2017). 
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values. It is important to note that while revenge porn is undoubtedly often 
motivated by misogyny, and may well reflect specific political/cultural 
values regarding the social role of women on the part of both posters and 
viewers, that is not why it should be treated as falling outside core First 
Amendment coverage. Rather, it is the specific mode of communication, its 
highly personal and highly intrusive aspect, that makes it, like the fighting 
words prosecuted in Chaplinsky, “no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas.”293 The precise same content, without the element of personal 
intrusion (for example, consensual pornography), would certainly receive 
constitutional protection given its cultural valence. It is the invasive aspect 
of revenge porn that adds nothing to political or cultural discourse, and so 
makes it not “speech” for First Amendment purposes. Put differently, what 
can be punished is not the misogyny, but the betrayal associated with revenge 
porn. In this sense, prosecution of revenge porn is similar to imposing 
liability for breach of contract via speech, which the Supreme Court has 
permitted.294 As such, given the obvious and important public interest in 
protecting the victims of revenge porn, there is no barrier to state regulation 
in this area. 
Products liability, including liability based on defective speech “products” 
such as maps and charts, and liability based on failure to warn or defective 
instructions, again seems a simple coverage issue. The communications at issue 
here are entirely functional in nature, and their functions do not relate in the 
vaguest way to democracy, citizenship, culture, or politics. Moreover, the social 
interest in compensating individuals harmed by defective products or defective 
instructions is so obvious it needs no explanation. Again, therefore, a seemingly 
intractable doctrinal problem can be resolved easily if one abandons the modern 
Court’s unwillingness to take coverage issues seriously. Put differently, no one 
seriously thinks that products liability law is in real tension with the First 
Amendment. Here, I am simply offering an explanation for why this mass 
wisdom is obviously correct. 
Finally, we turn to professional speech. The coverage problem here is much 
more complex and debatable than in the other examples discussed in this Part. 
Insofar as regulations of professional speech involve application of 
uncontroversial norms regarding professional competence, they seem to pose no 
serious First Amendment problems because the speech at issue, again, seems in 
most cases to be very distant from political or cultural concerns. Put differently, 
the First Amendment’s coverage surely does not extend to most malpractice 
law. However, the modern disputes over professional speech pose much harder 
questions. Conversion therapy is not simply a professional service; it also has a 
strongly ideological component to it. As such, bans on conversion therapy also 
have an ideological edge, albeit they can be defended as prohibiting an 
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empirically harmful practice. The underlying issue in the Florida “Docs vs. 
Glocks” litigation—whether medical professionals may treat gun ownership as 
a medical or health issue295—is an even more obviously ideological question, 
to which no empirically “correct” answer can possibly exist. Given the strong 
cultural and political values at stake in these disputes, the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion that professional speech regulation raises no First Amendment 
concerns seems clearly incorrect. This is not to say that its ultimate decision to 
uphold California’s conversion therapy ban was incorrect, but at a minimum, 
courts must insist that such regulations are supported by substantial empirical 
evidence of social harm. And similarly with Florida’s gun-inquiry law. 
Otherwise, professional speech regulation can become a mask for the very thing 
the First Amendment prohibits, which is state manipulation of the values and 
beliefs of citizens through suppression of speech. 
Professional speech then poses an interesting middle ground. Most 
regulations of professional speech do not pose serious First Amendment 
concerns because most professional speech has nothing to do with the purposes 
of the First Amendment. However, at times professional speech regulation 
certainly can stray into the realm of politics and culture. Conversion therapy296 
and treatment of gun ownership297 are obvious examples, but one can envision 
others, such as assessing the professional status of treatment for hypersexual 
behavior disorder (sex addiction),298 or imposing ethical restrictions on lawyers 
who advocate or support public interest litigation.299 In these contexts, the 
professional speech being regulated does fall within the First Amendment’s 
coverage—in other words, it is “speech” as well as speech. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
My primary argument in this Article is that modern developments, 
including an increasingly expansive and exacting First Amendment doctrine 
in the Supreme Court and the escalation of harms caused by speech as a 
result of the ubiquity of the Internet, require us to reexamine the problem of 
First Amendment coverage. Despite the Supreme Court’s insistence to the 
contrary, it is simply not plausible in this world to insist that all speech 
constitutes “speech” for First Amendment purposes. I argue that the history 
and context of the First Amendment strongly suggest that in fact not all uses 
                                                                                                                     
 295 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc). 
 296 See supra notes 199–207 and accompanying text. 
 297 See supra notes 208–24 and accompanying text. 
 298 See Alexandra Katehakis, Sex Addiction Beyond the DSM-V, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 
21, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/sex-lies-trauma/201212/sex-addiction-
beyond-the-dsm-v [https://perma.cc/2WRA-EG9A] (discussing the consequences of the 
American Psychiatric Association’s decision to exclude this disorder from the Fifth Edition 
of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual for Psychiatric Disorders). 
 299 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963). 
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of language constitute “speech,” and indeed not even all acts of 
communication should be treated as “speech” for constitutional purposes. 
Instead, First Amendment protection should extend only to collective, 
communicative activity that has relevance to democratic citizenship and self-
governance (defined broadly). This approach helps explain why some widely 
shared instincts about the limits of First Amendment protections are correct 
in a way that current doctrine cannot explain; but it also suggests that in 
some instances, apparently widely shared assumptions about coverage, for 
example regarding private prayer and diaries, are incorrect.  The ultimate 
goal, of course, is a coherent approach that provides guidance to courts and 
regulators on First Amendment coverage issues. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that hard questions will remain. Clear 
rules are always desirable, and especially so in the context of free speech, for a 
number of reasons.300 Sometimes, however, careful and nuanced analysis 
cannot be avoided. Professional speech provides one example of a sphere where 
nuance is unavoidable. Another, even more complex one is commercial 
speech—which is why this Article does not address commercial speech in detail. 
The problem is that commercial speech, as originally and narrowly defined to 
encompass only “speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial 
transaction’”301 seems fairly clearly outside First Amendment coverage under 
my approach. However, the Supreme Court later extended the definition of 
commercial speech to include some discussion of subject matters clearly 
relevant to the democratic process.302 And at least one court has invoked that 
holding to classify what seems to be clearly political communications as 
commercial speech.303 Given those uncertainties about the scope of the 
commercial speech doctrine, no simple conclusions regarding coverage are 
possible. 
In short, once one concedes that not all uses of language constitute 
constitutional “speech,” some sensible results follow, but other hard questions 
remain. It is no doubt because of a desire to avoid those hard questions that the 
modern Court has to date evaded the coverage issue so assiduously. Time, 
however, has run out. Under modern circumstances, an “all or nothing” 
approach to the First Amendment is no longer feasible. It is time, therefore, to 
                                                                                                                     
 300 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Essay, Free Speech and “A Law of Rules,” 15 FIRST AMEND. L. 
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build a workable theory of First Amendment coverage. I have attempted here to 
begin that project, but plenty of hard work remains to be done. 
  

